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INTRODUCTION

Illinois courts addressed a variety of real property law issues
during the Survey period.' In the area of landlord-tenant law, the
Illinois Supreme Court expanded landlord liability for criminal
acts of third parties. 2 The court also resolved a number of real
estate tax issues.3 In the appellate courts, the most noteworthy
cases involved an interpretation of a provision of the Township
Open Space Act.4 Appellate court decisions also involved landlords' waiver of strict compliance with lease terms,5 real estate brokers' entitlement to commissions,6 real estate tax assessments,7 and
the recording system.8
Environmental concerns dominated Illinois legislative developments during the Survey year. The legislature enacted the Responsible Property Transfer Act, which imposes environmental
disclosure requirements on the owners of property in connection
with its sale, mortgaging or other transfer. 9 In addition, the legislature adopted certain amendments to the Environmental Protection Act which, among other things, create environmental
reclamation liens.' 0 The State also enacted the Home Equity Assurance Act to guarantee homeowners the value of their homes
upon sale. 11
II.

EMINENT DOMAIN'

2

AND OPEN SPACE

The Township Open Space Act ("Act") authorizes a township
to acquire interests in real property by purchase or through eminent domain proceedings. 3 During the Survey period the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Second District decided five cases challenging Libertyville Township's power under the Act to acquire
1.

The Survey year is from July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989.

2.

See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See
See
See

9.

See infra note 193-223 and accompanying text.

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

125-71 and accompanying text.
13-56 and accompanying text.
78-101 and accompanying text.
102-25 and accompanying text.
141-61 and accompanying text.
172-92 and accompanying text.

10.
11.

See infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.

12.

The Illinois eminent domain statute may be found at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 139,

paras. 322 -25 (1987), amended July 29, 1988, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 139, paras. 322-28
(West Supp. 1988).
13. Id. para. 324.02.
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various parcels of land.' 4 Although the same court decided all of
the cases, the holdings are not consistent.
Town of Libertyville v. First NationalBank 11 arose when, in November 1985, a majority of voters voting in a referendum conducted in Libertyville Township approved the adoption of an openspace district and the acquisition of open land by purchase, condemnation or otherwise. The Act allows a township to acquire real
16
property that is "open land" as defined in section 2(b) of the Act.
Section 2(b) defines open land as any "area of land... of an area of
50 acres or more, the preservation or the restriction of development or use of which would . ." promote certain objectives, including conservation of natural and scenic resources, enhancement
of outdoor recreation opportunities, protection of flora and fauna,
and preservation of historic sites.
Following the referendum, litigation arose in connection with
the Township's attempt to condemn or purchase parcels of land
less than fifty acres in size. Owners of property in Libertyville contended that the Township could acquire only parcels of fifty or
more acres. The Township took the position that the Act permits
acquisition of smaller parcels provided that they are part of larger
parcels of at least fifty acres.
Libertyville instituted an eminent domain action against the
First National Bank of Lake Forest as trustee under an Illinois
land trust. 17 Pursuant to the Act, Libertyville attempted to acquire
a parcel of real estate from the Bank. The circuit court dismissed
the action because the 2.98518acre parcel did not constitute "open
land" as defined in the Act.
The appellate court agreed with the property owners that the
Township could not acquire a parcel less than fifty acres in size.19
Libertyville had argued that section 2(b) of the Act is ambiguous
and that the fifty-acre provision is "[o]nly intended to impose a
minimum acreage requirement upon a township's entire open
14. Egidi v. Town of Libertyville, 181 Ill.
App. 3d 542, 537 N.E.2d 369 (2nd
1989); Town of Libertyville v. Blecka, 180 Ill.
App. 3d 677, 536 N.E.2d 1271 (2nd
1989); Town of Libertyville v. Connors, 185 Ill. App. 3d 317, 541 N.E.2d 250 (2nd
1989); Town of Libertyville v. Ypma, 181 Ill.
App. 3d 305, 536 N.E.2d 1275 (2nd
1989); Town of Libertyville v. First Nat'l Bank, 178 Ill.
App. 3d 591, 533 N.E.2d 54
Dist. 1988), aff'd, 133 Ill.
2d 356, 549 N.E.2d 1274 (1990).
15. 178 Ill.
App. 3d 591, 533 N.E.2d 54 (2d Dist. 1988).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 139, para. 322(b) (1987).
17. First Nat'l Bank, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 591, 533 N.E.2d at 54.
18. Id. at 592, 533 N.E.2d at 54.
19. Id. at 593, 533 N.E.2d at 54.

Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
(2nd
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space program. ' 20 The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's
decision, stating that the statute is not ambiguous and that words
used in section 2(b) should be given their plain and ordinary meaning; therefore, only areas of land consisting of fifty acres or more
can qualify for condemnation as open space.2 l
Three months later, in Town of Libertyville v. Blecka,22 the same
appellate court, without mentioning FirstNational Bank, held that
section 2(b) of the Act is ambiguous and that a ten-acre tract may
be subject to Libertyville's right of eminent domain. 23 The ten-acre
parcel involved in Blecka abutted 285 acres of land already part of
the Township's open space and was adjacent to a seventy-acre tract
under condemnation by Libertyville.24
In reversing the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, the appellate court stated that Libertyville could acquire parcels of less
than fifty acres if they are portions of tracts of "50 acres or more
being contemporaneously condemned," or if "the land abuts or adjoins a tract 50 acres or more already owned by [a township] as
part of its open-space program. ' 2 The court noted that this interpretation of "open space" would facilitate the Act's objectives to
transfer or acquire land for open-space purposes. 6
20. Id. at 593, 533 N.E.2d at 55.
21. Id. The dissent disagreed and argued that section 2(b) is ambiguous with regard
to the meaning of the word "area" the second time it is used in the section. Id.at 594-95,
533 N.E.2d at 56-57. According to the dissent, it is not clear whether the legislature
intended the term "area" to mean "region" both times it is used in the definition or if it
was meant to mean "region" the first time it appears and "size" the second time. Id. The
dissent reasoned that if the word "area" means "size" the second time it is used, the
phrase "of an area" is rendered superfluous because the meaning would have been imparted more clearly had the definition of open land simply read any "area of land... of
50 acres or more." Id. The dissent stated that the language should be construed to
facilitate the Act's objectives to conserve large areas of open space and that the fifty-acre
provision should be interpreted to mean that a parcel may be acquired if it is part of a
larger region of fifty acres or more. Id. at 595-96, 533 N.E.2d at 57. To require that a
parcel must contain at least fifty acres before it may be condemned pursuant to the Act
may necessitate dealing with multiple property owners and may make acquisition less
likely. Id.
22. 180 Ill. App. 3d 677, 536 N.E.2d 1271 (2nd Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 132
(1989).
23. Id. at 681-82, 536 N.E.2d at 1274-75. Blecka thus tracked the dissenting opinion
in First Nat'l Bank.
24. Id. at 678, 536 N.E.2d at 1272. The trial court found that the parcel was not
open land as defined under the Act because it was less than fifty acres in size.
25. Id. at 682, 536 N.E.2d at 1275. The court stated that to determine if the parcel
was large enough to satisfy the Act's acreage requirements, the adjoining parcels, the 285acre existing open space tract, and the 70-acre parcel being contemporaneously condemned, could be taken into account. Id.
26. Id. at 682, 536 N.E.2d at 1274.
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In yet another case, Town of Libertyville v. Ypma 27 the appellate
court refused to allow Libertyville to condemn land that was
neither part of a fifty-acre tract being contemporaneously condemned nor abutting or adjoining a tract of at least fifty acres already owned by the Township as part of its open-space program.28
The trial court had granted the property owners' motion to dismiss
the condemnation action, holding that because the parcel was only
nineteen acres and the open-space property it adjoined was only
three, the fifty-acre provision was not satisfied.29 On appeal,
Libertyville repeated its First National Bank argument that the
fifty-acre requirement was a statutory minimum. 30 It also contended that because the open-space program included well over
fifty acres, the Township could exercise its powers of eminent domain over a nineteen-acre parcel.31
Libertyville further argued that the Ypma property was part of a
contiguous area of more than fifty acres of open land,32 including a
Roman Catholic cemetery that abutted existing township openland parcels located just north of and adjoining the cemetery.
Concluding that it had met the fifty-acre requirement, Libertyville
argued that the property could be condemned.33 The appellate
court disagreed, stating that Libertyville could not include the
cemetery in its open-space program because it did not own the
cemetery.34 The court also rejected Libertyville's argument that
various parcels north of the cemetery should be considered contiguous to the subject parcel.3 5 The court commented that
Libertyville could not piece together totally unrelated pieces of
36
property in order to satisfy the fifty-acre requirement.
The appellate court addressed the contiguity requirement again
in Egidi v. Town of Libertyville,37 and once more it held that the
Act's fifty-acre requirement was not satisfied because the parcels
27. 181 Ill. App. 3d 305, 536 N.E.2d 1275 (2nd Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133
(1989).
28. Id. at 310-11, 536 N.E.2d at 1279.
29. Id. at 308, 536 N.E.2d at 1277.
30. Id. at 309, 536 N.E.2d at 1278. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31. 181 Ill. App. 3d at 309, 536 N.E.2d at 1278.
32. Id. at 310, 536 N.E.2d at 1279.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 311, 536 N.E.2d at 1279. Furthermore, Libertyville could not acquire the
cemetery through condemnation because the Act expressly exempts property owned by
religious organizations from a township's eminent domain powers. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 181 Ill. App. 3d 542, 537 N.E.2d 369 (2nd Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 108
(1989).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 21

involved were not contiguous. The plaintiff brought an action on
behalf of all residents and taxpayers of Libertyville. 3' The complaint alleged that Libertyville had purchased certain property
without authority under the Act. 39 According to the plaintiff, the
property did not satisfy the fifty-acre provision in the Act." The
trial judge found that despite a physical separation of 270 feet, the
parcels were contiguous and that their combined area exceeded
fifty acres.41 The judge concluded that the Township had authority
to purchase the property because the fifty-acre requirement was
satisfied.42
The appellate court reversed, holding that the parcels were not
contiguous and, taken separately, neither constituted an area of
land 50 acres in size.43 The court stated that "two regions of land
completely separated by a 270-foot right away held by a different
entity cannot be considered an 'area of land'."'" Libertyville had
argued that because these parcels would be considered contiguous
for certain purposes, including annexation under the Illinois Municipal Code ("Code"), 45 they were to be considered contiguous
under the Act. Although it acknowledged that "[iun the law of
municipal annexations, two parcels separated by a road ...could
be considered contiguous, or connected, because of the common
boundary of the road," the court did not consider the Code's provisions relevant to the Act.'
Three months later, in Town of Libertyville v. Connors,4 7 the
court held that the Code's definition of contiguity, as used for purposes of municipal annexation, may apply to condemnation.4" As
a result, the court found contiguous two parcels (one comprising
38. Id. at 543, 537 N.E.2d at 370.
39. Id. The fifty-acre provision applies whether the township condemns or simply
purchases the property. Id.
40. Id. at 544, 537 N.E.2d at 371. The property in question in Egidi consisted of two
parcels: one measured approximately 49.5 acres; the other measured approximately 1.25
acres. Id. A 270-foot wide right-of-way owned by a utility company separated the two
parcels. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 545, 537 N.E.2d at 372.
44. Id.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 7-1-1 (1987). Annexation is discussed in Troy and
Fehringer, State and Local Government, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 601, 621 (1990).
46. Egidi, 181 Ill.
App. 3d at 545, 537 N.E.2d at 372 (citing Town of Libertyville v.
Connors, 185 Ill. App. 3d 317, 325, 541 N.E.2d 250, 254 (2nd Dist. 1989)). See infra
notes 47-56 and accompanying text (for a discussion of Connors).
47. 185 Ill. App. 3d 317, 541 N.E.2d 250 (2nd Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 132
(1989).
48. Id. at 326, 541 N.E.2d at 255.
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approximately forty acres and the other totalling almost twentynine acres) even though they were separated by a road.4 9 Because
of the separation, the trial court held that Libertyville did not have
authority to condemn the property. 0 The trial judge excluded evidence that the owner considered the property contiguous for purposes of annexation. 5
The appellate court reversed and held that the parcels were contiguous. First, the court was influenced by the owner's beleif that
both parcels were one tract for purposes of annexation.5 2 Second,
the court concluded that the Code's definition of "contiguous," as
used in connection with municipal annexation, should be applied
in interpreting the Act. The court pointed to amendments to the
Act that added the word "contiguous" and provided that it should
be given the same
meaning as it has for purposes of annexation
53
under the Code.

After holding that the parcels were contiguous, the court attempted to distinguish Egidi by pointing out that the Connors parcels were separated only by a two-lane roadway; the Egidi parcels
were separated by a right-of-way held by another owner.54 The
Connors dissent found the majority's attempt to distinguish Egidi
unconvincing.55 Commenting on the inconsistent holdings in this
area and the need for resolution by the Illinois Supreme Court, the
49. Id.
50. Id. at 320, 541 N.E.2d at 251.
51. Id. at 326, 541 N.E.2d at 255. The property owner had previously filed a petition
seeking to annex his property to the City of Waukegan. Id. The trial court may have
relied on a case decided three months earlier in which the court held that the principles of
municipal annexation were not relevant to the Act. See Egidi v. Town of Libertyville,
181 Ill. App. 3d 542, 537 N.E.2d 369 (2d Dist. 1989) discussed supra at notes 37-46 and
accompanying text.
52. Connors, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 326, 541 N.E.2d at 255.
53. Id. For purposes of annexation, The Illinois Municipal Code considers property
contiguous even when such property is separated by a public right of way. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 24, para. 7-1-1 (1987). Thus the parcels in Connors would have been contiguous for annexation under the Code. The term "contiguous" recently was added to another provision in the Act. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 139, para. 324.02(b) (West Supp.
1989). The amendment provides that "contiguous" shall have the same meaning as it
does for purposes of municipal annexation. The Connors court concluded that it could
infer that if the term "contiguous" had been used in the definition of open space, it would
be given the same meaning as it has in another section of the Act. 185 Ill. App. 3d at 325,
541 N.E.2d at 255.
54. Id. at 325, 541 N.E.2d at 254 (citing Egidi v. Town of Libertyville, 181 Ill. App.
3d 542, 537 N.E.2d 369 (1989)).
55. Id. at 331, 541 N.E.2d at 258 (Reinhard, J., dissenting). The dissent reviewed the
cases interpreting the fifty acre provision as well as Herbes v. Graham, 180 Ill. App. 3d
692, 536 N.E.2d 164 (2d Dist. 1989), in which the Act's constitutionality was challenged.
Connors, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 332, 541 N.E.2d at 259 (Reinhard, J., dissenting).
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of the Act and its
dissent suggested that the court's interpretation
6
re-examined.
be
should
constitutionality
The inconsistent holdings in the five Libertyville cases indicate
the need for clarification of the meaning of "open space" under the
Township Open Space Act. A uniform interpretation is required
before the Libertyville example is repeated in other townships.
III.

A.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

Landlord's Liabilityfor CriminalActs of Others

In Illinois, generally, a landlord owes no duty to protect its tenants from criminal activity on the leased property." During the
Survey period, however, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Rowe v.
State Bank of Lombard,5" that a landlord who has created a situation in which criminal acts of third parties are foreseeable has a
duty to warn its tenants or to take reasonable precautions against
such acts.

9

In Rowe, the landlord leased office space in a building in an office
park." The landlord maintained master keys to all of the offices,
and the evidence indicated the landlord could not account for
every key. 61 An intruder assaulted two employees of a tenant on
the leased premises, and one of the employees died.62 The assailant
was employed at the office park prior to the crime. On the day of
the assault, he was seen inside other buildings at the park. On one
occasion, a witness saw him entering one of the office park buildings with a set of keys.63
The victims brought actions for wrongful death and personal injury against the landlord, owner, and the managing agent. 4 Stating
that a landlord has no duty to protect a tenant's employees from
third-party criminal acts, the trial court granted the owner's and
agent's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court
affirmed.65
56. Id.
57. Rowe v. State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 215, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1364 (1988). See
Bingle and Meyer, Torts, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 661, 662 (1990) (for further discussion of
Rowe).
58. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358.
59. Id. at 221, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
60. Id. at 208, 531 N.E.2d at 1360.
61. Id. at 222, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
62. Id. at 208, 531 N.E.2d at 1360.
63. Id. at 223, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
64. Id. at 208, 531 N.E.2d at 1361.
65. Id. at 211-13, 531 N.E.2d at 1361-63.
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The supreme court reversed the order granting summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.66 The court stated that in negligence actions, the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant breached a duty owed to the
plaintiff, which proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. 67 The
Rowe plaintiffs alleged that by instituting some security measures
throughout the office park, the landlord voluntarily assumed a
duty to protect the tenants from criminal acts on the premises.68
The court noted a series of cases in which landlords who voluntarily undertook to provide security measures for tenants, but performed the work negligently, were held liable for criminal acts of
third parties.69
Nevertheless, the court concluded that no evidence had been
presented to indicate that the landlord "did anything which could
reasonably be considered as constituting a voluntary assumption of
protecting" the victims from the criminal acts of third parties.70
The court, however, found that there was sufficient evidence to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the landlord
breached the duty by failing to maintain proper control over the
distribution of the master keys. 7 ' According to the court, "by retaining access to the individual office units and manufacturing
master and grandmaster keys . . . [the landlord had] assumed a
duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent unauthorized entries by individuals possessing those keys." 72
After determining that a duty existed that may have been
breached, the court turned its attention to the requirement of proximate cause. The court considered persuasive certain cases in
which a landlord's negligence facilitated reasonably foreseeable
third-party criminal acts. 3 In applying those cases to Rowe, the
court stated that it was reasonable to infer that the landlord's fail66. Id. at 230, 531 N.E.2d at 1370-71.
67. Id. at 215, 531 N.E.2d at 1364 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 217, 531 N.E.2d at 1364-65. The landlord had maintained lighting near the
entrances, investigated complaints about criminal activity on the premises, covenanted to
keep the locks and doors in repair, and maintained security devices on the premises. Id.
69. Id. at 217, 531 N.E.2d at 1365. See Phillips v. Chicago Housing Authority, 89
Ill. 2d 122, 431 N.E.2d 1038 (1982); Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 82 11. 2d 313,
412 N.E.2d 472 (1980); Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d
596 (1979).
70. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 218, 531 N.E.2d at 1365.
71. Id. at 222, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
72. Id. at 221, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
73. Id. at 224, 531 N.E.2d at 1368. See Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497
N.E.2d 433 (1986), appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1987); Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm
Servs., 82 Ill. 2d 313, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980); Stribling v. Chicago Housing Authority, 34
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ure to take precautions against unauthorized use of the master keys
facilitated the assailant's entry.74 The landlord was aware that
master keys were unaccounted for and that numerous office burglaries not involving forced entry recently had been committed in the
office park.75 Consequently, the court determined that triable issues of fact existed as to the crimes' foreseeability and as to
whether the landlord's failure to take reasonable precautions
against such crimes proximately caused the death and injuries.76
Although the Illinois Supreme Court in Rowe found circumstances that might impose liability on a landlord, it clearly distinguished itself from other state courts that have imposed a general
duty on landlords to protect tenants from the criminal acts of
others.77 Although the court did not recognize this general duty, it
did impose on a landlord who retains keys to the leased premises a
duty to maintain proper control over those keys. Thus the Illinois
Supreme Court in Rowe has carved out an exception to the rule
that a landlord may not be held liable for the criminal acts of third
parties on the leased premises.
B.

Landlord's Waiver of Strict Compliance with Lease

In McGill v. Wire Sales Co. 78 and Baird and Warner, Inc. v. Al-

Par, Inc.,79 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District addressed situations in which landlords filed forcible entry and detainer actions. In each case, the landlord's conduct, prior to filing
the action, had led the tenant to believe that the landlord would
not insist on strict compliance with the lease terms. The court held
that possession will be awarded to a landlord only if, after waiving
strict compliance, the landlord subsequently notifies the tenant
that it expects the tenant to strictly adhere to the lease terms.
After several months of tolerating non-payment of rent and notices of building code violations, the landlord in McGill provided
written notice to his residential tenant that he had terminated the
Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1975); Mims v. New York Life Ins. Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d
283, 273 N.E.2d 186 (1971).
74. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 225, 531 N.E.2d at 1369.
75. Id. at 226, 531 N.E.2d at 1369.
76. Id. at 228, 531 N.E.2d at 1370.
77. Id. at 216, 531 N.E.2d at 1364. The plaintiffs had urged the court to impose a
general duty on a landlord to protect tenants from criminal activity on the leased premises. The court refused, commenting that an overwhelming majority of courts similarly
have rejected this general duty. Id.
78. 175 Ill. App. 3d 56, 529 N.E.2d 682 (1st Dist. 1988).
79. 183 Ill. App. 3d 467, 539 N.E.2d 192 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 104
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1135 (1990).
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lease. 80 The tenant responded by sending the landlord a check for
unpaid rent and a notice that the tenant had elected to exercise its
option under the lease to purchase the property.8 ' The landlord
returned the portion of the money representing rent for the remainder of the month after the landlord had declared the lease
terminated but retained the balance.82 In addition, the landlord
informed the tenant that because the lease was terminated, the tenant could not exercise the option to purchase the property. The
tenant then filed a complaint seeking specific performance of the
option provision, 3 and the landlord filed a forcible entry and detainer action. 84 The trial court granted the tenant's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of specific performance. 85
The appellate court affirmed.86 In support of its ruling, the court
stated that because the law does not favor forfeitures, the courts
will interpret as an intentional waiver of forfeiture any act of a
landlord that acknowledges the lease's existence, following a
breach of which the landlord has knowledge.8 7 In this case, by
accepting back rent, the landlord waived his right to a forfeiture.
Of particular interest was the court's refusal to enforce a lease provision that allowed the landlord to accept back rent following lease
termination. In the court's view, the landlord's actions waived the
particular lease provision as well as the forfeiture.88
Moreover, the landlord was estopped from terminating the lease
when he did. He had not required strict performance of the lease
terms with regard to the timeliness of rental payments and compliance with laws; therefore, the option still existed when the tenant
exercised it.89 Based upon the landlord's acquiescence in the de-

faults, the tenant was entitled to believe that the landlord was not
requiring strict compliance with the lease terms. Under such circumstances, unless the landlord notifies the tenant that he will require strict compliance in the future, the court will not permit a
forfeiture for the tenant's failure to adhere strictly to the lease
terms.'
80. McGill, 175 I1. App. 3d
81. Id. at 58-59, 529 N.E.2d
82. Id. at 59, 529 N.E.2d at
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 57, 529 N.E.2d at
87. Id. at 59, 529 N.E.2d at
88. Id. at 60, 529 N.E.2d at
89. Id. at 61, 529 N.E.2d at
90. Id.

at 58, 529 N.E.2d at 683-84.
at 684.
684.

683.
684.
685.
685.

580
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In contrast to McGill, the court in Al-Par permitted a forfeiture
because the landlord had provided the tenant with notice that it
intended to hold the tenant strictly to the lease. 9 ' After almost five
years of tolerating late rent payments and use violations of the
lease, 92 the landlord wrote to the tenant demanding strict compliance with the lease. 93 More than one month later, after the tenant
failed to commence any cure of the violations, the landlord served
a ten-day notice to quit and subsequently filed a complaint for possession. 94 In its factual findings, the trial court stated that the tenant had failed to comply with certain lease provisions and did not
comply even after the landlord demanded strict compliance. 95 The
trial court also stated that the landlord's waiver of strict compliance during the lease term was negated by 96the landlord's subsequent written demand for strict compliance.
On appeal, the tenant argued that in cases involving use violations, letters demanding strict compliance were of "no legal significance." 97 In addition, the tenant argued that it would be
inequitable to give possession to the landlord after more than four
years of the lease term had elapsed. 98 The appellate court, however, disagreed with the tenant's arguments and affirmed the lower
court's decision. 99 The appellate court held that although the
landlord had waived its right to strict enforcement of the use provisions in the lease, the subsequent demand letter nullified the
waiver.1°° In response to the tenant's allegation of inequity, the
court stated that allowing, a tenant to sell virtually anything in vio91. AI-Par, 183 Ill. App. 3d 467, 539 N.E.2d 192. The tenant leased the premises for
use as a health and beauty aide store. The lease prohibited the premises to be used for
any other purpose. The lease also required the landlord's consent to the tenant's display
of signs, and it obligated the tenant to maintain the premises in a clean, sightly, and
healthy condition. Id. at 468-69, 539 N.E.2d at 194.
92. Id. The evidence revealed that the premises were not maintained in a clean,
sightly condition. The evidence also revealed that the tenant sold radios, motor oil, food,
paint brushes, and radial tire repair kits on the premises. Id.
93. Id. at 469, 539 N.E.2d at 194.
94. Id. at 470, 539 N.E.2d at 194.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 472, 539 N.E.2d at 196. In response to this contention, the appellate court
stated that the tenant was "simply wrong." Id. The court cited two cases involving use
violations "where a demand for strict compliance was effective in nullifying previous
waivers ..... Id. See 222 East Chestnut Corp. v. Murphy, 341 111. App. 430, 94 N.E.2d
364 (1950); Burch v. Hickman, 330 Ill. App. 155, 70 N.E.2d 421 (1947).
98. Al-Par, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 472, 539 N.E.2d at 196.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 470, 539 N.E.2d at 194.
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lation of his lease would be the "most glaring inequity."' 0 '
The decisions in McGill and Al-Par resulted in tenant victory in
the former case and defeat in the latter. In each case, however, the
court found that a landlord's waiver of its right to strict enforcement of lease terms may be overcome by a subsequent demand for
strict compliance.

IV.

REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND LISTING AGREEMENTS

A real estate broker is an agent for a principal in a transaction
involving disposition of property. Generally, a broker is paid compensation in the form of a commission as specified in an agreement
between the parties. 10 2 During the Survey period, the appellate
court decided three cases involving real estate brokers who sought
to be paid commissions pursuant to their listing agreements.
In Coldwell Banker v. Jepsen,103 the seller contacted a broker's
sales associate by telephone four days after signing a listing agreement. During the conversation, the seller told the sales associate
that he had changed his mind about selling his home. '" The sales
associate agreed to take the house off the market. Later, she became aware that the seller was showing the house. She contacted
the seller and advised him that the listing was still in effect and that
if the home were sold, a commission would be due. The seller
closed on the sale of the home shortly thereafter.1°5
When the seller refused to pay the commission, the broker filed a
suit for breach of contract.'06 The seller alleged in his defense that
the listing had been revoked during his conversation with the broker's sales associate. At trial, the jury found that the broker was
entitled to the commission. 107 The judge denied the seller's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for a new
trial."°0 The first district affirmed, holding that although the listing
agreement was a unilateral offer that could have been revoked in
good faith at any time by the seller,'°9 the seller's conversation did
101. Id. at 472, 539 N.E.2d at 196.
102. See Bennett and Kahnweiler Ass'n v. Ratner, 133 Il1. App. 3d 316, 319, 478
N.E.2d 1138, 1140-41 (1st Dist. 1985).
103. 172 Ill. App. 3d 662, 527 N.E.2d 79 (2nd Dist. 1988).
104. Id. at 663, 527 N.E.2d at 81.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 665, 527 N.E.2d at 82. The notice of revocation may be oral or written
and need not be express, if the agent knows or should know of an event occurring "from
which the inference of termination could reasonably be drawn." Id.
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not constitute a sufficient revocation. 110 A sufficient revocation
must be more than an expression by the seller of his desire not to
sell his house.
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District denied a broker's claim for commission in Grayway Real Estate Corp. v.
Dickey.' In April 1985, the broker and the owners of a condominium unit entered into an exclusive agency agreement for the
sale of the unit.1 1 2 In August 1985, the owners terminated the listing agreement. Later that same year, the owners sold the unit to a
buyer who originally had been shown the unit by the broker.11 a
The broker claimed a commission in connection with the sale.
When the sellers refused to pay, the broker sued.'I 4
The owners contended that the listing agreement was void because it provided for automatic extension rather than automatic
termination. I 5 The broker argued that the listing agreement provided for automatic termination at the end of one year. The circuit
court determined that the listing period was for 90 days and that
after that period expired, the agreement was to be automatically
the trial court entered a summary
renewed. 1 Consequently,
1 6
judgment.
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's holding that the
listing agreement was void because automatic extension, rather
than automatic termination, of the listing period violated the Real
Estate License Act of 1983 ("Act"). 117 The appellate court commented that the Act's intent would be circumvented if agreements
could be renewed automatically for short periods as long as they
eventually terminated."'
110. Id.
111. 178 Ill. App. 3d 477, 533 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1988).
112. Id. at 478, 533 N.E.2d at 100.
113. Id. at 478, 533 N.E.2d at 101.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 479, 533 N.E.2d at 101. The listing agreement provided that:
[t]he Term of this Agreement ('Term') shall commence on the date of execution
hereof and shall continue for 90 days thereafter. After the expiration of said
period, the Term shall continue in effect, unless and until terminated by either
party with at least ten days prior written notice to the other, provided, however,
that, notwithstanding the foregoing, this Agreement shall terminate one year
from the date of execution.
Id. at 478, 533 N.E.2d at 100.
116. Id. at 479, 533 N.E.2d at 101.
117. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5819 (1987), which provides "[a]ny
listing contract not containing a provision for automatic expiration shall be void").
118. Id. at 479, 533 N.E.2d at 101. The Act's intent is to prevent a property's marketability from stagnating in the hands of one broker. Id.
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Although the Dickey court did not address whether the broker
was entitled to equitable relief for having been the procuring cause
of the sale, the court did address this issue in Paine!Wetzel v.
Dockside Development Corp."9 The Dockside court held that a real
estate broker cannot base an equitable claim for a commission on
an expired listing agreement. Rather, the claim must be based on
20
the assertion that the broker was the procuring cause of the sale.'
The broker in Dockside filed a claim for a commission due under a
listing agreement that had expired four days before the seller sold
a
the property.' 2' The trial judge, relying on the principle that 22
court may ignore the expiration date in the interest of equity,
granted the broker's motion for summary judgment. The appellate
court also agreed that a broker should be compensated for service
benefitting the principal, even if the listing agreement has expired. 123 It reversed, however, on the grounds that the trial judge
had misapplied the rule in Bennet and Kahnweiler Ass'n v.
Ratner.'24 A broker's claim cannot be founded on the expired listing agreement; it must be a claim for equitable relief25based upon on
the broker's being the procuring cause of the sale.
The net effect of these decisions is that listing agreements must
be for specific periods of time and must contain exact termination
dates. They may be revoked by sellers, but the revocation must
involve more than an express desire to take the property off the
market. Finally, a broker may be entitled to a commission, even if
the listing agreement between the parties has expired if the broker
was the procuring cause of the sale and is seeking equitable relief.
V.

REAL ESTATE TAX

During the Survey year, taxpayers brought actions against various county officials in connection with the procedures used in real
estate tax sales and for tax assessment of real property. Taxpayers
also sought relief in the courts when their properties were denied
tax exempt status.
119. 174 Il1. App. 3d 999, 529 N.E.2d 588 (1st Dist. 1988).
120. Id. at 1000-01, 529 N.E.2d at 589.
121. Id. at 1000, 529 N.E.2d at 589.
122. Id. (citing Bennett and Kahnweiler Ass'n. v. Ratner, 133 Ill. App. 3d 316, 478
N.E.2d 1138 (1st Dist. 1985)). Ratner held that a court may look beyond the formality of
an expiration date in order to fairly and equitably compensate the broker for service that
benefitted the principal. Ratner, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 321, 478 N.E.2d at 1141-42.
123. Dockside, 174 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 529 N.E.2d at 589.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1000-01, 529 N.E.2d at 589.
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Tax Sales

Section 235a of the Revenue Act of 1939 authorizes a county
treasurer to conduct sales of properties that are tax delinquent for
1 27
five or more years.126 In Rosewell v. Park Place Investments,
owners of various interests in tax delinquent property sought to
prevent Rosewell, the Cook County Treasurer, from including
their respective properties in the 1987 scavenger sale. The proper28
ties had all been sold previously at the 1980 and 1983 sales.
The purchasers of the properties at the 1980 and 1983 scavenger
sales received certificates of sale but did not petition for, or receive,
tax deeds.'2 9 Because the purchasers failed to secure deeds within
the time prescribed by the Act, their certificates, and the sales on
which they were based, were null and void. 130 Accordingly, the
Treasurer attempted both to include these properties in the 1987
scavenger sale and to include as part of Cook County's current tax
lien the taxes that had been unpaid at the time of the 1980 and
3
1983 scavenger sales.' '

The owners of the properties argued that the tax liens on the
properties sold in 1980 and 1983 had been extinguished upon confirmation of those sales, thus preventing the Treasurer from including them as current tax liens. 32 Relying on a provision in the Act
stating that the in rem lien of the real estate taxes shall be extinguished upon confirmation of the scavenger
sale, the trial judge
33
entered an order stopping the sale.1
126.

The owner is personally liable for the remaining tax delinquency. ILL. REV.
ch. 120, para. 716a (1987).
127. 127 Ill. 2d 404, 537 N.E.2d 762 (1989). See also Berry and Wooding, Taxation,
21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 633, 649 (1990) (additional discussion of Park Place).
128. Park Place, 127 Ill. 2d at 406, 537 N.E.2d at 763.
129. Id. at 407, 537 N.E.2d at 763.
130. Id. at 408, 537 N.E.2d at 764. The Act states that:
[u]nless the holder of the certificate for real estate purchased at any tax sale
under this Act takes out the deed in the time provided by law, and files the same
for record within one year from and after the time for redemption expires, the
certificate or deed and the sale on which it is based, shall, from and after the
expiration of such one year be absolutely null and void with no right to
reimbursement.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 752 (1987).
131. Park Place, 127 Ill. 2d at 408, 537 N.E.2d at 763. The Treasurer included those
taxes to satisfy the Act's five-year delinquency requirement. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 407, 537 N.E.2d at 764.
133. Id. Section 235a of the Act states that "[u]pon confirmation, a sale pursuant to
this Section shall extinguish the in rem lien of the general taxes, special taxes and special
assessments for which judgment has been entered and a redemption shall not revive the
lien." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 716a (1987).
STAT.
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On direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, 34 the Treasurer
argued that because the 1980 and 1983 sales were null and void
pursuant to section 271 of the Act, the tax liens were not extinguished. 35 The court stated that the Act, being a revenue statute,
must be strictly construed and that any ambiguity should be resolved against the Government. 36 The court was not persuaded
that section 271 of the Act made the sales retroactively void. The
section's plain language provides that such sales are null and void
"from and after" one year following the redemption period's expiration. 13 7 Consequently, the court held that the in rem tax liens are
extinguished upon confirmation of sale in accordance with section
235a of the Act, and they are not retroactively revived by section
271.13 s This will be true even if the purchaser of the property at a
scavenger sale subsequently fails to secure a tax deed. 1 39 Although
the property is free from the tax liens, the owners are still personally liable for the remaining tax deficiency. 4o
B.

Tax Assessment

The Illinois Department of Revenue uses a "multiplier"-an
equalization factor-to minimize the differences in property values
between the counties.1 4' The Illinois Supreme Court rejected an
attack by taxpayers on the Cook County multiplier in Advanced
Systems, Inc. v. Johnson. 42 The taxpayers objected to the Department's methodology for determining the median level of assessments and the administrative procedures and review process
employed by the Department in computing the multiplier. 143 The
taxpayers also attacked the equalization process on due process
134. The Treasurer's motion for direct appeal was granted pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 302(b), which allows direct appeals when the public interest requires prompt adjudication by the supreme court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para.
302(b) (Supp. 1988).
135. Park Place, 127 Ill. 2d at 408, 537 N.E.2d at 765.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 409, 537 N.E.2d at 765.
138. Id. at 410, 537 N.E.2d at 765.
139. Id. at 411, 537 N.E.2d at 765.
140. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 716a (1987)).
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 627, 630 (1987).
142. 126 Ill. 2d 484, 535 N.E.2d 797 (1989).
143. Id. at 490, 535 N.E.2d at 799. The court explained that
The Department is directed to equalize assessments between [Illinois'] 102
counties so that the assessed valuation of real property in each county will, in
aggregate, be at the specified level of 33 1/3% of its fair cash value. (citations
omitted) To equalize the property values between counties, the Department
annually calculates an equalization factor, or "multiplier", to be applied to the
aggregate assessed valuation of property in each county. In other words, the
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and constitutional grounds. 1 " The supreme court granted the taxpayer's motion for direct review of the circuit court's decision in
the Department's favor.1 45 The court, nevertheless, rejected each
of the taxpayers' arguments and upheld the methodology and administrative review process implemented by the Department in its
calculation of the multiplier.'14
First, the court held that the Department has no statutory duty
to use property appraisals to ascertain the median level of assessment.147 Second, the Department's failure to stratify each subdivision of a property class did not render its studies unrepresentative
and statistically invalid.148 Third, the Department was not required by statute to verify information regarding personal property
reported on the real estate transfer declaration. 149 Fourth, the Department's practice of editing out transactions that are not made at
arm's-length or convey only a part of a parcel of property was acceptable. 150 Finally, the Department's use of the array median,
rather than a weighted median, to measure central tendency was
5
proper. ' '
In response to the taxpayer's objection to the multiplier on due
process grounds, the court held that the Department did not adjudicate any individual rights in calculating the county-wide multiplier, thus the Department did not deny the taxpayers due
process. 512
Cook County's real estate tax assessment procedure fell under
attack again in Rosewell v. Twin Manors.I53 Once more, the procedure was upheld. The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that the county is the proper geographic area for
multiplier may raise or reduce the aggregate assessed valuation of property
within a county to meet the statutory level of 33 1/3% of fair cash value.
Id.
144. Id. at 491, 535 N.E.2d at 799-800.
145. Id. The supreme court granted direct review pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 302(b). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 302(b) (Supp. 1988). See supra note 134
(for a discussion of Rule 302(b)).
146. Advanced Systems, 126 Ill. 2d at 507, 535 N.E.2d at 807.
147. Id. at 492-506, 535 N.E.2d at 802-05.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 507, 535 N.E.2d at 807. The court also rejected the taxpayers' contention
that the statute establishing the multiplier is invalid because it embraces more than one
subject matter. Id.
153. 175 Ill. App. 3d 564, 529 N.E.2d 1104 (1st Dist. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3244 (1989).
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determining if assessments are disproportionate. A condominium
association, Twin Manors, contended that Cook County assessed
its real estate at a higher level than comparable real estate located
in the same township.' 54 The County responded by stating that
taxpayers must compare their properties' assessed valuations to
those of other properties within the entire county and not only the
township. 55 The trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Twin Manors presented statistical evidence to support the argument that its property was being disproportionately
156
assessed compared to other properties in the same township.
The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that
Twin Manors' evidence failed to show that a township level of assessment, rather than a county-wide level, is the proper one.' 57
The court stated that the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides for
assessments to be made at the county level and that ample case law
supports the use of county-wide assessments. 15 8 The court rejected
the condominium association's argument that, because various sections of the Illinois Revenue Act of 1939 ("Act") 59 provide,
among other things, for the division of counties into assessment
districts along township lines, that the assessments are to be made
according to townships. The court commented that assessment
districts are created for practical purposes. The Act indicates that
"a county-wide level of assessment is to be utilized." 60 Thus, in an
era of successful taxpayer revolts, and despite what the trial judge
in Advanced Systems described as an assault using "excellent legal
craftsmanship ... [and] a high-powered caliber Howitzer,"' 16 ' Illi154. Id. at 566, 529 N.E.2d at 1105. Cook County contains thirty-eight townships.
It assesses residential property at 16% of its fair market value. COOK COUNTY REAL
PROPERTY ASSESSMENT CLASSIFICATION ORDINANCE §§ 2, 3 (1980). Twin Manors determined that its property was assessed at only 15.35% of fair market value. This exceeded the median level of assessment for comparable properties within the township.
Twin Manors, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 566-67, 529 N.E.2d at 1106.
155. Id. at 566, 529 N.E.2d at 1107.
156. Id. at 567, 529 N.E.2d at 1106.
157. Id. Twin Manors had presented no evidence that its property was disproportionately assessed compared to other properties within the entire county.
158. Id. at 568-69, 529 N.E.2d at 1106-07. "Counties with a population of more than
200,000 may classify ... real property for purposes of taxation.... The level of assess-

ment or rate of tax of the highest class in a county shall not exceed two and one-half
times the level of assessment or rate of tax of the lowest class in that county." Id. (citing
ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. 9, § 4(b)).
159. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 482 -82.7a (1987).

160. Twin Manors, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 571, 529 N.E.2d at 1108 (citing ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, para. 524 (1987)).
161. Advanced Systems, 126 Ill. 2d at 489-90, 535 N.E.2d at 799 (1989).
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nois property owners lost two battles during the Survey year.
C. Tax Exemptions
In a consolidated action, Harrisburg-RaleighAirport v. Department of Revenue,1 62 the Illinois Supreme Court held that airport
hangars leased to private individuals were exempt from taxation.
To reach this conclusion, the court examined the meaning of section 19.20 of the 1939 Revenue Act, 63 which exempts from taxation "all property of every kind belonging to any Airport
Authority and used for Airport Authority purposes."' 64 The
court's decision turned upon whether the hangars were being used
for "Airport Authority purposes." The Department of Revenue
contended that, because the hangars were leased or rented to private individuals, they were not tax exempt. 65 According to this
argument, only a public use of the airport facilities provides a tax
exemption.1 66 The court stated that the legislature's creation of a
separate airport-authority exemption suggested that the exemption
should be construed broadly enough to include non-public uses,
provided those uses further airport authority purposes.167 That the
hangars were leased to private parties was not inconsistent with the
6
notion of a "public" airport.1 1

Illinois courts also decided several other cases involving taxpayers who claimed that their properties were exempt from real estate
taxation under exemption provisions of the Revenue Act. For example, in Cantigny Trust v. Department of Revenue, 169 the court
stated that employee residences on the grounds of a charitable institution were not necessary to perform the institution's charitable
functions and were used primarily as residences. In DePaul University, Inc. v. Rosewell, 70 the court held that a university's tennis
courts were not used primarily for school purposes because the
University leased the tennis courts to a private tennis club that
used the courts more than the University's tennis team and physical education classes. In DuPageArt League v. Department of Rev162. 126 Il.2d 326, 533 N.E.2d 1072 (1989). This decision affirmed the appellate
court's decision. See Berry and Wooding, Taxation, 21 Loy. U. CU. L.J. 633, 646 (1990)
(for an extensive discussion of Harrisburg-Raleigh).
163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 500.20 (1987).
164. Id.
165. Harrisburg-Raleigh,126 Ill. 2d at 332, 533 N.E.2d at 1074.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 334-35, 533 N.E.2d at 1076.
168. Id. at 335, 533 N.E.2d at 1075.
169. 171 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 526 N.E.2d 518 (2nd Dist. 1988).
170. 176 Ill. App. 3d 755, 531 N.E.2d 884 (1st Dist. 1988).
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enue,' 7 the court held that the county art league's primary
purpose was to benefit its members and that any benefits the league
conferred on the public were secondary.
In each case of this type, the court ruled that the taxpayers used
the property for a primarily non-exempt purpose. Illinois appellate
courts continue to deny tax exempt status on the well-established
principle that in order to qualify for tax exempt status, a mixed-use
property must be used primarily for a tax exempt purpose.
VI.

RECORDING

When various parties have interests in the same real estate, a
court is often called upon to decide which party has the paramount
interest or lien against the property. The cases often turn upon
whether any of the parties had constructive notice of the other parties' interest. A party will be deemed to have constructive notice of
a prior recorded interest. During the Survey year, an appellate
court resolved two cases involving disputes over whether mortgagees had constructive notice of other parties' interests in the mortgaged properties.
In Security Savings and Loan Association v. Hofmann, Security Savings made a loan to Hofmann and his second wife secured
by a mortgage on property in which Hofmann had an interest, pursuant to a contract for deed.
Before the mortgage was recorded,
a court awarded the first wife alimony secured by a lien on the
property. She filed a notice of pending suit, but not the judgment
itself, in the county where the real estate was located. 174 Later,
when Hofmann and his second wife were in default under the
mortgage, Security Savings attempted to foreclose on the property.
Hofmann's parents, to whom the first Mrs. Hofmann had assigned
the judgment relating to the property, were joined as defendants in
the foreclosure proceedings. They filed a counterclaim, asserting
that the first wife's lien, now theirs by assignment, was superior to
that of the lender. 5 The circuit court granted the lender's motion
for summary judgment and Hofmann's parents appealed.
17 2

17 3

17

171. 177 Il. App. 3d 895, 532 N.E.2d 1116 (2nd Dist 1988).
172. 181 111. App. 3d 419, 537 N.E.2d 18 (3d Dist. 1989).
173. Id. at 420, 537 N.E.2d at 19.
174. Id. A judgment does not become a lien against Illinois real property until a
certified copy or memorandum of judgment is recorded with the county recorder. Id. at
422, 537 N.E.2d at 19-20 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-101 (1987)). The first
wife recorded a certificate of judgment approximately three months after the mortgage
was recorded. Id. at 422, 537 N.E.2d at 19.
175. Id.

590
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The lender argued that its lien was superior because the first
wife's judgment was not recorded prior to the mortgage, and her
filing of a lis pendens notice was insufficient to create a lien on the
property. 176 The appellate court agreed with the lender that a
proper lien had not been created, but it noted that Security Savings
had constructive notice of the first wife's interest in the property as
a result of her recording the lis pendens notice prior to the recording of the mortgage. 7 7 Based on the presence of constructive notice of the prior lien, Security Savings was not a bona fide
purchaser but "stood in the shoes" of the mortgagor and took subject to the judgment lien that eventually attached to the property.1 78 Accordingly, the trial court should have entered summary
judgment in favor
of Hofmann's parents on the issue of the priority
79
of the liens. 1

In Skidmore, Owings and Merrill v. Pathway Financial,80 two
companies, Pathway Financial ("Pathway") and Skidmore, Owings and Merrill ("Skidmore"), made loans to the same borrower,
Talbot, for the purchase of certain property."8 Both lenders obtained mortgages on the property to secure their respective
loans. 18 2 When Talbot defaulted on both loans and each lender
attempted to foreclose, litigation arose to determine which lender
had the superior lien. 8 3 Both lenders denied having actual notice
of the other's mortgage.18 The outcome then depended upon
which lender, if either, had constructive notice of the other's mortgage. 8 5 Although the appellate court stated the general rule that
"[tihe primary means of charging any party with [constructive] notice of an interest in real property is to record that interest,"' 86 it
agreed with the trial court's ruling that Skidmore's prior recording
176. Id. at 422, 537 N.E.2d at 19-20.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 423, 537 N.E.2d at 20.
180. 173 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 527 N.E.2d 1033 (3d Dist. 1988).
181. Id. at 513, 527 N.E.2d at 1034.
182. Id. At the closing of the purchase, Talbot received a deed to the property and
then delivered his note and mortgage to Pathway. The deed to Talbot and Pathway's
mortgage were recorded fourteen days after the closing. The balance of the purchase
price Talbot paid at closing was paid with cash he obtained from Skidmore. Id. Pathway
was unaware that Skidmore was funding the down payment. Two days after the closing,
Talbot executed a note and mortgage in favor of Skidmore for the amount of the down
payment. Skidmore recorded its mortgage ten days after the closing. Id.
183. Id. at 514, 527 N.E.2d at 1034.
184. Id. The first party to give notice of its lien has the senior lien. Id. Generally,
when any party has notice of a prior lien, it will take subject to that lien. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 514, 527 N.E.2d at 1034.
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of its mortgage did not constitute notice to Pathway and that Pathway's lien had priority over Skidmore's. "7
The appellate court supported its holding in two ways. First, the
court held that Skidmore's recording did not constitute constructive notice to Pathway because Skidmore's mortgage was recorded
outside of the chain of title.' 8 8 Talbot was not the record owner at
the time of Skidmore's recording.8 9 Pathway, however, recorded
its mortgage immediately after recording the deed to Talbot. The
court stated that Pathway could not have expected that an intervening lien recorded outside of the chain of title would somehow
gain priority. 9 ° Second, the appellate court relied upon Continental Investment and Loan Society v. Wood ' 9' for the proposition that
"the party which executed its mortgage simultaneously
with the
192
transfer of the warranty deed had the senior lien".
Security Savings and Skidmore emphasize the importance of the
recording system. Even if an interest properly is not a lien on real
estate, if some evidence of that interest is recorded, the recording
will constitute constructive notice of the interest. Subsequent purchasers or mortgagees are charged with such notice and will take
their interests in the property subject to the prior interest. Conversely, if an interest is not properly recorded, it will not constitute
constructive notice and will not be given priority over subsequently
recorded interests.
187. Id. at 515-16, 527 N.E.2d at 1034-35.
188. Id. Although Skidmore recorded its mortgage ten days after Talbot had closed
on the purchase of the property, the deed to Talbot had not yet been recorded. Id.
189. Id. at 515, 527 N.E.2d at 1034. The appellate court's conclusion that Skidmore's mortgage was outside the chain of title may not be correct. The court implied
that in searching the grantor index, Pathway would be required to search only for transfers Talbot made after the date of the recording of his deed. A title searcher, however,
would be required to search the grantor index for transfers made by Talbot from the date
of the deed to Talbot and afterward. See The Chain of Title: A Real Property Law Basic
Revisited, 34 REAL PROPERTY, ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N No. 6 (February 1989).
190. Skidmore, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 515, 527 N.E.2d at 1035.
191. 168 Ill. 421, 48 N.E. 221 (1897).
192. Skidmore, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 515, 527 N.E.2d 1035. (citing Continental, 168 I11.
421, 48 N.E.2d 221 (1897)). In Continental, the sellers took back a purchase money
mortgage at closing but did not record the deed or mortgage until several months later.
Following the closing, the purchasers executed a mortgage to another lender that was
recorded before the deed or the purchase money mortgage. Id. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that second mortgage's recording did not constitute notice to the sellers. Id.
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Responsible Property Transfer Act

The Responsible Property Transfer Act of 1988 ("RPTA") 93 requires disclosure of the environmental condition of certain real
property prior to its conveyance. The RPTA focuses on disclosure
of the condition of real property and not on correction of environmental problems. The RPTA does not make cleanup of contaminated property a prerequisite to its transfer.
1. Purpose of the RPTA
The RPTA's purpose is to "ensure that parties involved in certain real estate transactions are made aware of the existing environmental liabilities associated with ownership of such properties, as
well as the past use and environmental status of such properties." ' 94 In addition, its purpose is to inform property owners of
environmental problems, thereby encouraging environmentally responsible behavior.' 95 Although not a cleanup statute itself, the
RPTA is intended to foster cleanup activities consistent with the
purpose and intent of existing environmental cleanup laws.196
2.

Scope of the RPTA

Prior to transferring property, the parties involved in the transaction need to determine if the property involved and the type of
transfer contemplated are subject to the RPTA. Not all property is
subject to the RPTA. The statute covers properties that contain
one or more facilities that are subject to reporting under section
312 of the Federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act of 1986,197 and federal regulations promulgated thereunder. The RPTA 98 also covers properties which have underground storage tanks that require notification under section 9002
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act as amended.' 99
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, paras. 901 -07 (West Supp. 1988), amended September
1, 1989. 1989 111. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
paras. 901 -07). The RPTA became effective on November 1, 1989.
194. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 902 (West Supp. 1988).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 -050 (1986). Section 312 of the Act appears at 42 U.S.C.
§ 11022.
Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
198. 1989 I11.
para. 903(e)).
199. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 -6992k. Section 9002 of the Act appears at 42 U.S.C. § 6991a
(1986).
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The first group of covered properties are those for which safety
records for hazardous chemicals must be compiled and maintained
in accordance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970. 200 Such facilities include those that use certain threshold
quantities of particular hazardous chemicals. The thresholds are
established by the Administrator
of the Illinois Environmental
20°
Protection Agency ("IEPA").
The second group of covered properties are those that have underground tanks holding certain regulated substances 20 2 including
petroleum. 0 3 Properties containing underground tanks holding
heting oil for use on the premises are exempt. 201 Also exempt are
farm or residential properties with tanks storing less than 1,100
gallons of motor fuel for noncommercial purposes.20 5
Although not many properties are subject to the RPTA, almost
all transfers of subject properties are covered. The RPTA defines
transfers as follows: sales, including assignments of more than
twenty-five percent of the beneficial interest in an Illinois land
trust; leases for terms, including all options, exceeding forty years;
mortgages; and collateral assignments of beneficial interests in Illinois land trusts." 6
3.

Disclosure Under the RPTA

If it is determined that both the property and the transfer (occurring after January 1, 1990) are subject to the RPTA, then the
200.

29 U.S.C. §§ 651 -678. See 42 U.S.C. § 11022 (1986).

201.

42 U.S.C. § 11022(b) (1986).

202. "Regulated substances" are defined in section 9001 of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act as "hazardous substances" as defined in section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)
(1986).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2)(B) (1986).
204. Id.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1)(A) (1986).
206. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 903(g)). A "transfer" does not include release deeds; deeds, mortgages or collateral
assignments which, without additional consideration, confirm, correct, modify or supplement a previously recorded document; tax deeds; deeds of partition; conveyances occurring as a result of a foreclosure of a security interest in real property, including
mortgages, trust deeds and other real property liens; Uniform Commercial Code sales or
other foreclosure of collateral assignments of beneficial interests in land trusts; advances
by a lender secured by a previously recorded mortgage, trust deed or by a prior collateral
assignments; amendments to previously recorded mortgages or trust deeds or prior collateral assignments if no new advances are made; easements; and conveyances of interests in
minerals, oil or gas. Id. Corporate transactions such as stock sales are not specifically
excluded, but they do not fall within the definition of a "transfer," and, therefore, appear
by implication to be excluded.
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transferor must provide to the transferee 20 7 a disclosure document. 20 8 The disclosure document must be delivered within thrity
days following the execution of a written contract for transfer of
the property, but not later than thirty days prior to the transfer. 2°9
This time period may be waived by the parties to the transfer, but
the document still must be delivered prior to the recording of a
conveyance document. 1 0 If a transfer involves multiple transactions, the duty to disclose is satisfied if the primary transferor executes and delivers a disclosure document to each transferee. 2 1 The
transferor must record the disclosure document with the Recorder
of Deeds of the county in which the transferred property is located,
and he must file it with the IEPA within thirty days of the transfer
or upon recording of a212deed or other instrument of conveyance,
whichever occurs first.
The disclosure statement is in questionnaire format and is set
forth in the RPTA.2 13 On the disclosure statement, the transferor
must respond to four categories of questions relating to the past
and present environmental condition of the property. In response
to the first category of questions, the transferor describes the property and its current use. This description includes information
about the improvements (and containers) located on the property
and the operations conducted on the property. 2 4 The second category of information to be provided in the disclosure document pertains to past violations of environmental regulations and existing
variances or special permits issued to the transferor for certain reg207. 1989 I11. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 903(h)).
208. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 904(a)).
209. Id.
210. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 904(b) (West Supp. 1988).
211. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 904(a)). Multiple transactions include, by way of example, a sale and mortgage,
and a sale and lease back. Id.
212. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 906). Responsibility for recordation rests equally on the transferor and transferee,
not including a mortgagee. Id.
213. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 905).
214. Id. The description of the property must include: its size; the type of improvement located on the property; the location of any units used to manage waste including
storage tanks, landfills, waste piles, septic tanks and incinerators. In describing the use of
the property, the transferor must disclose: releases of hazardous substances on the site;
operations on the property involving generation, manufacture, processing, treatment,
storage of certain hazardous substances including petroleum; and filings made by the
transferor with governmental agencies of chemical safety contingency plans, chemical
inventories or chemical release forms. Id.
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ulated activities. 21 5 The questions in the third category ask the
transferor about any attempted cleanup of contamination on the
property. The fourth group of questions relates to the previous
ownership of the property and the type of activity conducted on
the property by the prior owner. 21 6 The disclosure statement contains space for explanation of the transferor's responses.
4.

Remedies and Penalties Under the RPTA

Any party to a transfer subject to the RPTA may, in its discretion, void any obligation to accept a transfer or finance a transfer of
the property if the disclosure statement has not been produced or if
the disclosure statement reveals environmental defects in the real
property that previously were unknown.21 7 In addition, if a violation of the RPTA by any person results in damage to another person, such other person may bring an action against the violator.21 8
The court, in its discretion, may award monetary damages.21 9
The RPTA also subjects the transferor to civil penalties of up to
$1000 per day for failing to deliver the disclosure document in accordance with section 4.22o Failure to record the disclosure document in accordance with section 6 of the RPTA results in joint and
several liability for civil penalties in an amount not to exceed
$10,000.221 Stiffer penalties are imposed for false statements made
on a disclosure statement.22 2 Actions to recover civil penalties and
to compel compliance with the RPTA are to be brought by the
215. Id. In response to this category of questions the transferor must list: notices
received or actions taken by governmental agencies regarding alleged contamination on
or emanating from the property; variances issued by the Illinois Pollution Control Board;
permits held by the transferor for discharges of waste water, emissions to the atmosphere
or waste storage, treatment or disposal. Id.
216. Id. The transferor need only respond to the questions in this category if he has
knowledge of prior activities.
217. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 904(c)). Nothing contained in this subsection (c) of section 4 of the RPTA "shall be
deemed to release a party to the real property transfer from the obligation to pay or
reimburse the lender for fees, costs, and expenses." Id. Nor will the failure to comply
with any provision of the RPTA "invalidate ... or affect the lien or the priority of any
mortgage, trust deed, or collateral assignment of beneficial interest in an Illinois land
trust." 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 904(d)).
218. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-679 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 907(e)).
219. Id. In addition to damages, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs to the prevailing party.
220. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 907(a) (West Supp. 1988).
221. Id. para. 907(c) (West Supp. 1988).
222. Id. para. 907(b) (West Supp. 1988). Any person or transferor who with actual
knowledge makes a false statement on the disclosure statement shall be liable for civil
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State's Attorney for the county in which the violation has occurred, or the Attorney General on his own motion,
or at the re22 3
county.
the
of
citizen
a
or
IEPA
quest of the
B.

Environmental Protection: Land Pollution

In addition to enacting the Responsible Property Transfer Act,
the Illinois legislature took another step during the Survey year toward making property owners more environmentally responsible.
The legislature amended parts of the Environmental Protection
Act ("Act") 224 and added two new sections. 22 By way of the
amendment and additions to the Act, the legislature created environmental reclamation liens 226 and authorized the IEPA to acquire
real property.227
1. Environmental Reclamation Liens
Under sections 22.2 and 22.18 of the Act, owners of real property in Illinois may be liable to the State for fees collected by the
State for hazardous waste disposal and costs the State incurred in
the preventive action or cleanup of the owner's contaminated property. 228 The recent amendments provide that all unpaid costs and
damages for which a person is liable to the State pursuant to sections 22.2 and 22.18 now constitute an environmental reclamation
lien against the property in favor of the State of Illinois. 229 The
amount of the lien may not exceed the amount of the State's expenditures 23° plus interest thereon, accruing at the rate of twelve
per cent per annum beginning on the date the State files the lien.231
The IEPA will file the lien with the county official responsible for
recording judgments against real property in the county where the
penalties not to exceed $10,000 for such violation and $10,000 for each day such violation
continues. Id.
223. Id. para. 907(d) (West Supp. 1988).
224. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1001 -52 (West Supp. 1988). The 1988
amendment is to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 para. 1020.
225. Sections 21.3 and 21.4 are new. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 1021.3,
1021.4 (West Supp. 1988).
226, Id. paras. 1020(a)(10), 1021.3 (West Supp. 1988).
227. Id. para. 1021.4 (West Supp. 1988).
228. Id. paras. 1022.2, 1022.18 (West Supp. 1988). Section 22.2 created the Hazardous Waste Fund which consists fees collected by the State from property owners in connection with their disposal of hazardous waste. Under section 22.18, the State may take
preventive or corrective measures in the event of a release or substantial threat of release
of substances from underground tanks.
229. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1021.3 (West Supp. 1988).
230. Id. para. 1021.3(d) (West Supp. 1988).
231. Id. para. 1021.3(h) (West Supp. 1988).
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property is located.23 2 The environmental reclamation lien is superior to all other liens and encumbrances other than real estate taxes
and the liens of subsequent bona fide purchasers, mortgagees and
other lienors whose rights arose prior to the environmental reclamation lien's filing.23 3 The lien may be foreclosed on in the same
manner as other real property liens.234
2.

Acquisition of Property by the IEPA

Section 21.4 of the Act authorizes the IEPA to acquire real
property or any lesser interest therein, including an easement, to
"protect human health or the environment" or "to respond to the
release or substantial threat of release of any hazardous substance
or petroleum into the environment. ' 23 This standard is very
broad and will permit a great deal of discretion. In addition, the
IEPA may acquire real property through foreclosure of environmental reclamation liens.236 Section 21.4 also authorizes the
agency to convey, assign or transfer any real property interest acquired pursuant to this section. The IEPA may place environmentally related restrictions upon the use of the property so
transferred.237
C. Home Equity Assurance Act
During the Survey year, the Illinois legislature created the Home
Equity Assurance Act. 238 The Act provides a mechanism through
which homeowners can guarantee their home values. The purpose
of the statute is to provide homeowners relief from adverse local
housing markets. 239 The Act does not provide homeowners with
relief from falling home values related to nationwide or city-wide
housing market depression. The condition of the local housing
market must "differ from municipal-wide, regional, or national
' '2
housing conditions. 10
232. Id. para. 1021.3(c) (West Supp. 1988). Prior to filing the lien, the IEPA must
send notice to the property owner. Id.
233. Id. para. 1021.3(g) (West Supp. 1988). The filing of a lien will not preclude the
State from bringing an action for damages against the property owner. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. para. 1021.4 (West Supp. 1988).
236. Id. para. 1021.3 (West Supp. 1988).
237. Id.
238. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 1601 -20 (West Supp. 1988).
239. Id. para. 1602 (West Supp. 1988).
240. Id. The Act is not intended to provide relief from physical perils, natural disasters, acts of God or depreciation due to the homeowner's failure to maintain his home,
nor is the Act intended to serve as homeowner's hazard or liability insurance. Id.
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The mechanism through which the homeowners are able to
guarantee their home values is called a home equity program.
Residents of municipalities with populations of one million or
more may vote to establish a home equity program in their neighborhood.241 When residents adopt a home equity program in a
particular area, a commission (the "Commission") is appointed to
serve as the governing body.242
1. Participation and Procedure
An owner of a residence within a neighborhood that has adopted
a home equity program may apply for membership in the program
by submitting an application and an application fee to the Commission.243 Upon the receipt of the application and fee, the Commission arranges for the property to be appraised. After an acceptable
appraisal is prepared, a certificate of participation is issued to the
homeowner. The certificate states the guaranteed value and the
registration date.2" Once a resident is a member in the home equity program, the resident, upon sale of the house, will be paid
100% of the difference between the guaranteed value and the selling price of the property. 245 The member must notify the Commission when he or she intends to sell the property and must list the
home for sale in accordance with guidelines established by the
Act.246 If the owner has complied with the guidelines established
for sale of the property, and the property is sold for less than the
guaranteed value set forth in the certificate, the owner may make a
claim against the guarantee fund.24 7
2.

The Guarantee Fund

Each governing Commission will create and maintain a guaran241. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 1604 (West Supp. 1988). The registered voters in
a neighborhood or territory may petition the municipality to have a referendum at a
regular election on the question of creating a home equity program in their area. The
home equity program will be enacted if a majority of the voters approve the referendum.
Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. para. 1606 (West Supp. 1988). The owner of the residence must continuously occupy or have a family member who continuously occupies the home as a principal place of residence. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. para. 1607 (West Supp. 1988). The resident must be a member of the program for five years before seeking benefits. Any benefits paid to a member will be reduced
by the percentage of depreciation attributed to the member's failure to maintain the property. Id. para. 1608(e)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
246. See id. para. 1608 (West Supp. 1988).
247. Id.
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tee fund for purposes of administration and payment of claims. 24
The money may not be used for any other purpose and an annual
independent audit of the fund must be conducted. The money in
the fund will be raised by levying a tax on all residential property
containing one to six dwelling units within the neighborhood or
territory that formed a home equity program. The rate of the tax is
determined by the Commission.249
Voters may terminate the home equity program at an election in
the same manner that they created the program. 25 0 The Act prohibits any municipality with a population of one million or more
from establishing a home equity program other than as provided
by the Act.251
VII.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, the Illinois courts and legislature addressed a number of significant issues dealing with real property.
The Illinois Supreme Court focused on the issue of a landlord's
liability for the criminal acts of third parties on the leased premises. Although the court did not adopt the position of other jurisdictions that have imposed a general duty on landlords to protect
their tenants against such acts, it did expand such duty in the case
of foreseeable crimes when the landlord's failure to take precautions is a proximate cause of resulting damage. The supreme court
also determined that a county's in rem tax lien is extinguished
upon confirmation of a tax sale whether or not the purchaser later
obtains a tax deed, and it rejected a taxpayer attack on the process
for calculating the Cook County tax multiplier. Finally, the court
upheld a tax exemption for airport hangars leased to private
individuals.
The most significant development in the appellate courts during
the Survey period involved a series of cases in which the definition
of "open land" under the Township Open Space Act was at issue.
The appellate court's indecisiveness regarding which property is
subject to township acquisition pursuant to the Act may result in
reluctance to adopt such programs or voters' hesitancy to approve
them.
248.

249.
assessed
hood or
program
250.
251.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 1611 (West Supp. 1988).
Id. In no event can the tax be more than the lesser of (1) .12% of the equalized
valuation of all residential property within the program's territory or neighbor(2) the maximum rate approved by the voters in the referendum by which the
is created. Id.
Id. para. 1612 (West Supp. 1988).
Id. para. 1620 (West Supp. 1988).
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The Responsible Property Transfer Act is the one piece of legislation enacted in Illinois during the Survey period that will have
the greatest impact on real estate transactions. Although it requires environmental disclosure only for limited categories of
properties, it applies to a broad range of transactions involving
such properties. As a result, real estate practitioners must carefully evaluate the Act's applicability to the transaction in which
they are involved and, if applicable, ensure compliance.

